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Background: Theory-of-Mind (ToM) keeps on developing in late childhood and early
adolescence, and the study of ToM development later in childhood had to await the
development of sufficiently sensitive tests challenging more mature children. The current
study aimed to investigate the psychometric properties of the Danish version of the
Theory-of-Mind Storybook Frederik (ToM-Frederik).
Methods: We assessed whether ToM-Frederik scores differed between a group
of 41 typically developing (TD) children and a group of 33 children with High
Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder (HFASD). A lower mean ToM-Frederik score
was expected in the HFASD group. To determine the convergent validity of ToM-
Frederik, potential associations with Strange Stories and Animated Triangles (AT) were
analyzed. Furthermore, potential associations between ToM-Frederik and the Social
Responsiveness Scale (SRS) and between ToM-Frederik and the Social Emotional
Evaluation (SEE) Total score were analyzed.
Results: A significantly higher ToM-Frederik score was observed in the TD group
compared to the HFASD group. Furthermore, the convergent validity of ToM-Frederik
as a measure of ToM was supported by significant and positive associations with the
Strange Stories and the AT scores in the HFASD group, whereas ToM-Frederik was
significantly correlated with Strange Stories, but not with AT in the TD group. ToM-
Frederik was not significantly associated with SRS in neither the HFASD nor the TD
group.
Conclusion: The findings are supportive of ToM-Frederik as a valid indicator of deficits
at the group level in children with HFASD between 7 and 14 years of age. Furthermore,
the convergent validity is supported.
Keywords: Theory-of-Mind, validation, autism spectrum disorders
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INTRODUCTION
In order to study the interplay between social cognition and
psychopathology in the pathogenesis of mental disorders we need
more sensitive and specific measures of the various aspects of
social cognition including different levels of Theory-of-Mind.
Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is the ability to infer intentions,
desires and beliefs (Frith and Frith, 2012). Deficits in this
ability are present in a wide range of mental disorders, such as
autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and other neurodevelopmental
disorders, personality disorders, other non-psychotic disorders,
schizophrenia, and affective disorders (Brune and Brune-Cohrs,
2006).
The ‘gold standard test’ of comprehending other persons’
minds is to grasp that others can hold false beliefs (FB) different
from one’s own (correct) knowledge (Brune and Brune-Cohrs,
2006). The original and still prevailing ‘litmus’ tests for this ability
are (first-order) FB tasks (Abell et al., 2000), such as the Sally
and Anne test (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). FB reasoning has
been shown to be detectable as early as infancy (Baillargeon et al.,
2010), but the general perception is that typically developing
(TD) children will attain this ability at the age of 4, through a
progression of stages starting at 9 months with early aspects of
joint attention (Paparella et al., 2011). A developmental milestone
has been observed at around the age of 18 months, when children
become aware that their own mental states are distinct from
others’ (Korkmaz, 2011). At the age of 4 there is still considerable
instability in the understanding of FB (Hughes et al., 2005),
but from the age of 4–6 this understanding becomes firmly
established (Brune and Brune-Cohrs, 2006; Blakemore, 2008; Jha
and Singh, 2009).
Still, ToM comprises far more than FB alone, like for
instance the understanding of desires and emotions of others
(Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008). Testing ToM with only FB tasks
leaves out more sophisticated social-cognitive capacities such
as understanding metaphor, irony and ‘faux pas’ (a socially
awkward or tactless act) (Brune and Brune-Cohrs, 2006). Also,
first-order FB comprehension might be mastered at younger
ages, but second-order FB comprehension will not be mastered
before the age of 6–7 years in TD children (Dumontheil et al.,
2010). Second-order FB, where the child must think about a
second individual’s thoughts about a third individual’s thoughts
about an event (meta-representation), is often assessed through
the ‘Ice-cream man’ task (Sullivan et al., 1994). Lies and jokes
(Happé, 1994) and ‘faux pas’ may not be reliably understood by
TD children before the age of 8–11 years (Brune and Brune-
Cohrs, 2006), indicating that ToM further improves in late
childhood and early adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010).
Although ToM seems to continue to develop after the age of 6–
7 years, Dumontheil et al. (2010) found little evidence to support
this assumption. Since most standard ToM tasks are passed by
the age of 5 years, ceiling effects are presumably obscuring the
observation of any further development, as these tests do not
measure more complex abilities (White et al., 2009; Dumontheil
et al., 2010). Therefore, more comprehensive and challenging
ToM tests, such as the Strange Stories task, have been developed
(Happé, 1994; Brent et al., 2004).
Among the most widely used advanced ToM tasks are the
(revised) Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994; White et al., 2009).
The Strange Stories include tasks on pretense, joke, lie, white
lie, misunderstanding, persuasion, appearance/reality, figure of
speech, irony, double bluff, contrary emotions, and forgetting.
The task focuses on participants’ understanding of belief but is
developmentally appropriate for older children because of the
additional demands it places on using this understanding of
beliefs in complex, contextualized scenarios (Devine and Hughes,
2013). The Strange Stories task has been widely used in studies of
clinical populations and, more recently, in studies of TD school-
aged children (e.g., Ronald et al., 2006; Lecce et al., 2010). It has
proven successful in numerous studies in older children, showing
that children, adolescents and even adults with High Functioning
Autism Spectrum Disorder (HFASD) perform significantly worse
on the Strange Stories task than TD individuals (Happé, 1994;
White et al., 2009). Group differences between samples of TD and
HFASD children and adolescents have also been shown with the
Danish version of the original Strange Stories task (Kaland et al.,
2008).
Children and adults with ASD and with an intelligence
quotient (IQ) greater than 70 (HFASD) (Jacobs and Richdale,
2013), typically pass standard tests of first-order ToM such as FB
tasks, although they are delayed in acquiring this understanding
(Brent et al., 2004). The majority of individuals with HFASD also
pass second-order FB tests (Kaland et al., 2008), but might not
do so before their teens (Korkmaz, 2011). However, difficulties
passing the tests increase with test complexity. As an example, the
study by Kaland et al. (2008) found that children and adolescents
with high-functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome pass
standard ToM tasks but showed significant impairments in the
more ‘advanced’ ToM tests with complex social contexts.
A more recent, advanced ToM task is the Animated
Triangles (AT) test (Abell et al., 2000). This task consists of
series of computer-presented animations, and measure both
the understanding of the events depicted in the animations
(Appropriateness) and the degree of intentional attribution
(Intentionality) (Salter et al., 2008). This test has successfully been
used in a growing number of experiments to investigate ToM and
agency attribution in individuals with and without ASD (White
et al., 2011). Studies in both children and adolescents (Abell et al.,
2000; Salter et al., 2008; Schwenck et al., 2012) and adults (Castelli
et al., 2002; White et al., 2011) have found lower Appropriateness
score in ASD compared to TD. However, whereas differences in
Intentionality have been found in adults (White et al., 2011), this
is often not the case in samples of children and adolescents (Abell
et al., 2000; Salter et al., 2008). Nevertheless, this is considered a
promising way to investigate the more subtle differences in ToM
abilities in HFASD children and adolescents (Salter et al., 2008).
In the present study a new advanced ToM task was explored.
The Theory-of-Mind Storybook Frederik (ToM-Frederik – (Blijd-
Hoogewys and Bartels-Velthuis, 2007), which was developed for
children aged 10–12, contains ToM tasks of different levels of
difficulty, including first-order FB, deception, second-order FB,
white lie, irony, double bluff and ‘faux-pas’ (Bartels-Velthuis et al.,
2011). This task comprises both yes/no and justification questions
and a scoring system that allows for a detailed categorization
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 330
fpsyg-07-00330 March 5, 2016 Time: 18:35 # 3
Clemmensen et al. Assessments of Measures of Theory-of-Mind
of the answers in potentially different types of ToM deficits,
e.g., the exaggerated type of ToM alteration, termed HyperToM
(Clemmensen et al., 2014). This makes ToM-Frederik a relevant
instrument for studies addressing the hypothesis that specific
types of ToM deficits may be involved in the development of
specific symptoms (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Montag et al.,
2011).
The overall aim of the present study was to examine aspects
of validity and reliability of the Danish version of ToM-Frederik.
This version (ToM-Frederik) has been applied in a population
study of 1600 Danish 11–12-year-old children (Clemmensen
et al., 2014), but has not been applied to any clinical populations.
The original Dutch Theory of Mind Storybook – Frank has been
assessed in TD children and children with PDD-NOS and found
to have good psychometric qualities (good internal consistency,
test–retest reliability, inter-rater reliability, construct validity, and
convergent validity (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008).
We included a group of TD children and a group of children
with HFASD aged 7–14. The rationale for including a group with
ASD was that the presence of ToM deficits in this group is well-
established in both children and adults (Yirmiya et al., 1998;
Baron-Cohen, 2001; Colle et al., 2007).
First, we wanted to explore if ToM-Frederik could detect
the expected ToM deficits in the HFASD group as reflected in
significant differences in mean scores between the HFASD and
the TD groups. Second, we wanted to explore the converging
validity as reflected in potential significant associations between
scores derived from ToM-Frederik and the Strange Stories, which
we consider to be the gold standard ToM Task, and also AT.
Third, to test if ToM is associated with social function, we
wanted to assess potential associations between ToM-Frederik
and (1) the Social Emotional Evaluation (SEE) test and the SEE
parental questionnaire (SEQ) although the SEE only covers the
age range 6–12 and (2) the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS).
SEE and SEQ evaluate the social skills of the child (Wigg, 2013)
and SRS covers various aspects of interpersonal communication,
reciprocal behavior, and repetitive/stereotypic behavior. The
inclusion of these measures was based on the commonly accepted
idea that social cognitive deficits affect social function and skills.
Finally, we wanted to examine the test–retest reliability, and a
possible test–retest effect, of the ToM-Frederik.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Autism Spectrum Disorder Group
The sample consisted of children diagnosed with ASD at the
Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Centre in the Zealand Region of
Denmark or at the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Centre,
Mental Health Services in the Capital Region of Denmark. The
children were recruited during the study period from August
2013 until September 2014. The inclusion criteria were as follows:
(1) age 7–14, (2) a diagnosis of ASD according to the ICD-10
criteria (DF 84.0–84.9), (3) the diagnosis is based on a formal
evaluation by a specialist in child and adolescent psychiatry
following the Danish, national clinical guidelines for assessment
and diagnosis of ASD, (4) the absence of an intelligence level
below the normal range, as reflected in the absence of a mental
retardation diagnosis (DF 70.x), and an IQ at >70 measured
by a full WISC-III or WISC-IV or by a scale score of four or
above in both the Vocabulary and Block Design subtests from the
WISC-III or WISC-IV (if full test not administered), (5) sufficient
Danish language skills to participate in the ToM tasks, and (6)
parental written informed consent. As ToM-Frederik is primarily
aimed at children aged 10–12, the majority of the children were
recruited within in this age-range but we also included younger
and older children to assess if the age range of the task could
be extended. Originally, 37 participants with ASD were included
but four participants were excluded as they did not fulfill the
criteria regarding intelligence level. Thus, a total of 33 children
with HFASD were included: 3 children aged 7–8, 11 children aged
9–10, 12 children aged 11–12, and 7 children aged 13–14.
Typically Developing Group
The names and addresses of a random sample of children aged
7–14 years were extracted from the Civil Registration System (Det
Centrale Personregister; CPR). The TD children were invited
to participate in the study by mail in a neutral white envelope,
addressed to the child’s parents. The parents were asked to sign
up (through an online booking system) for an assessment of their
child at the clinic. Inclusion criteria were as described above
except no parental report of (1) developmental disorders, or
(2) special educational needs. Originally, 43 participants were
included but two participants were excluded due to not fulfilling
the criteria for intelligence level. We included a total of 41 TD
children: 8 children aged 7–8, 13 children aged 9–10, 14 children
aged 11–12, and 6 children aged 13–14.
Procedure
The HFASD group was tested at the clinic by clinically
experienced staff who received training and supervision in
administration of the tests. Trained researchers also tested the
TD group, either at home or at the clinic as preferred by the
parents. To avoid potential systematic fatigue effects on the
three ToM-tasks and SEE test performance, the order of the
administration changed successively for each new participant
within both groups (first participant; 1;2;3,4; second participant;
2;3;4;1; third participant; 3;4;1;2; etc.).
Ethics
The study was approved by The Danish Data Protection Agency
(J.nr 2013-011-02230) in the Capital Region of Denmark (J.nr.
2007-58-0015) and The National Committee on Health Research
Ethics was consulted (H-2-2013-FSP22) in accordance with
national guidelines.
Instruments
The ToM Storybook Frederik (ToM-Frederik) is the Danish
version of the ToM Storybook Frank (Blijd-Hoogewys and
Bartels-Velthuis, 2007), which tests the understanding of first-
order FB, deception, second-order FB, white lie, irony, double
bluff and ‘faux pas.’ Children are presented with 16 pictures while
listening to a tape recording of the storybook read aloud by a
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professional actor. Children are asked a total of 16 ‘test’ and 8
‘justification’ questions, covering a range of ToM abilities. The
16 ‘test’ answers are scored 1 (for a correct understanding of the
situation) or 0 (for an incorrect answer). The range of the ‘test’
sum score is 0–16. The justifications questions (such as “Why
did the mother say that?”,“Why does Frederik think that?”) are
classified according to 23 predefined categories and scored on an
ordinal scale (predefined for each situation). Categories include
Desire: The answer refers to the protagonist’s desire with respect
to the situation. It involves wanting or desiring something; Fact
belief: The child refers to the protagonist’s knowledge. It involves
thinking, knowing, being sure of, expecting or recognizing;
Situational – Dwelling on the situation without reference to
the mental state of the protagonist. Scores depend on the level
and quality of references made to the thoughts, beliefs, feelings
or intentions of the story characters or the child itself. The
range of the ‘justification’ sum score is 0–20. The test and
justification scores are summed in a total score of ToM skills
(range 0–36, with a higher score indicating better performance)
that serves as the primary measure (Clemmensen et al., 2014).
Ratings for ToM-Frederik were carried out by LC and RJ. Based
on all 74 participants the inter-rater reliability was excellent
(r = 0.96, p < 0.001) (George and Mallery, 2003). The typical
administration time of the ToM-Frederik was 15 min.
To measure the test–retest reliability and a possible test–retest
effect of the ToM-Frederik, we administered this test for a second
time to the 11–12-year-old children in the TD group 2–3 weeks
after the first administration.
The Strange Stories test assesses the child’s understanding
of: pretense, joke, lie, white lie, misunderstanding, persuasion,
appearance/reality, figure of speech, irony, double bluff, contrary
emotions, and forgetting (Happé, 1994) and provides means
for testing advanced ToM-ability, suitable for TD as well as
for both children (Brent et al., 2004) and adults with HFASD
(Sanders, 2009). Short vignettes are read aloud by the interviewer,
whereupon subjects are asked to explain why a character says
something that is not literally true (White et al., 2009). We used
a Danish translation of the revised version of the Strange Stories
(White et al., 2009) and included the eight Mental State Stories
(awarded 0, 1, or 2 points per story, the range of the sum score is
0–16) and the eight new Natural Physical State Stories (awarded
0, 1, or 2 points per story, the range of the sum score 0–16).
The mental and physical state sets both requires the integration
of information between sentences and inference from implicit
information, but only the mental state set requires mentalizing
(White et al., 2009). Thus, adjusting the Strange Stories Mental
State score for the Strange Stories Physical State score provides
a more focused measure of the ability to reason about mental
states specifically. Ratings for the Strange Stories were carried out
by LC and RJ. Based on independent ratings of the responses of
20 randomly selected participants, the inter-rater reliability for
the Mental State Stories was good (r = 0.73, p < 0.001) and the
Natural Psychical State Stories (r = 0.92, p< 0.001) was excellent
(George and Mallery, 2003). All ratings were compared to the
ratings of a senior researcher (JJ). No interrater-reliability with
the senior researcher was calculated, as consensus scores were
determined via discussion in all cases of differences in ratings.
The AT (Abell et al., 2000) task consists of a series of
computer-presented animations. These animations show one
large red and one small blue triangle moving around the screen
(White et al., 2011). The participants are instructed that, while
watching the animations, they have to give a concurrent verbal
description of what they think is happening. The participants
were expected to evaluate and characterize the interplay between
the triangles or lack hereof. These animations span scenarios
from ‘Random’ to ‘Goal-Directed’ and ‘ToM’-type situations, and
performance in terms of verbal descriptions were rated on scales
for Appropriateness and Intentionality. The AT Appropriateness
score measures the understanding of the event depicted in the
animations, as intended by the designers (0–3, with 3 being a
clear precise answer). A total score ranging from 0 to 12 was
calculated for each type of animation (see Castelli et al., 2000
for further details). The Intentionality score reflects the use of
mental state terms, with scores ranging from 0 (non-deliberate
action) to 5 (deliberate action aimed at affecting another’s mental
state). Total AT Intentionality score was calculated as the mean
for each animation type. If the participant failed to produce
a verbal description, AT Appropriateness was rated 0 and AT
Intentionality as the mean of the other answers for that type
of animations. Failure to produce verbal descriptions for two
or more animations within a given category meant exclusion
from this particular analysis. Separate scores were calculated
for the Random, Goal-Directed and ToM sets of animations.
Ratings were carried out by LC and RJ. Based on 20 randomly
selected participants, the inter-rater reliability for both the AT
Appropriateness score (r = 0.824, p < 0.001) and the AT
Intentionality score (r = 0.894, p < 0.001) were excellent
(George and Mallery, 2003). These ratings were compared to
the ratings of a senior researcher (JJ). No interrater-reliability
with the senior researcher was calculated, as consensus scores
were determined via discussion in all cases of difference in
ratings.
We also applied an objective method, originally developed
for adults, using multiple choice questions (MCQ) (White et al.,
2011). At the end of each animation participants would be asked
to categorize it as one of three types: ‘no interaction’ (Random),
‘physical interaction’ (Goal Directed), and ‘mental interaction’
(ToM) (referred to hereafter as AT MCQ-categorization score:
0–12 points). In cases of ToM type animations they were asked
additional questions to test their understanding of the mental
states depicted in the animation. The participants could choose
between one of five listed adjectives to best match the feelings
of each of the triangles at the end of the animation; a separate
list was provided for each triangle in each animation (referred to
hereafter as MCQ-feelings score: 0–8 points).
Performances on the Block Design and the Vocabulary subtests
of WISC-III or WISC-IV were used as indices of the intelligence
level. These subtest scores are known to be highly correlated with
IQ on the full Wechsler test of intelligence (Wechsler, 2003).
The SRS is a 65-item questionnaire (score 0–195), applied
to the parents who report on various aspects of the child’s
interpersonal communication, reciprocal behavior and
repetitive/stereotypic behavior. The SRS identifies the presence
and extent of autistic social impairments on a quantitative
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scale with higher scores indicating greater severity of social
impairment (Constantino et al., 2003).
Social Emotional Evaluation is a task administered to the child.
The SEE evaluates the social skills and higher level language
skills that children need for successful interaction in everyday
situations at home, at school and in the community. The SEE
assesses both the receptive and expressive social skills of children
aged 6–12, and includes tasks in which the child must identify
common emotions, recognize emotional reactions, understand
social gaffes, and understand conflicting messages. The following
three scores are calculated: Receptive (0–59 points), Expressive
(0–74 points), and Total score (0–133 points). A validation study
reported in the SEE manual including children with ASD and TD
children revealed large between-group effect sizes (Wigg, 2013).
The SEE Social Emotional Questionnaire (SEQ) is applied to
the parents and contains 45 questions on the social skills of
the child. The SEQ Raw score was divided by the total possible
points (maximum 180 points with no excluded questions) after
excluding questions with checkmarks in the ‘Don’t Know/Not
Applicable’ column to obtain the Parent SEQ Total Percentage
(Wigg, 2013).
Statistical Analyses
Analyses were carried out using SPSS 20. Student’s t-tests and chi-
square tests were applied to compare continuous and categorical
background variables (gender, age in months, Wechsler Block
Design scale score, and Wechsler Vocabulary scale score).
The test–retest reliability of the ToM-Frederik for the 11–12-
year-old children in the TD group was established by means of
a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Furthermore,
a paired samples t-test was applied to estimate the test–retest
effect by comparing the ToM-Frederik Total score from the first
assessment with the score from the second assessment.
Between-group comparisons were carried out to assess
whether the outcome variable from the ToM-Frederik differed
between the TD and the HFASD group. Not all children with
HFASD completed all tasks (five missed one task; one missed
two tasks; one missed three tasks or parts hereof). Thus, as
we aimed to include as many children as possible in each
between-group comparison, the number of participants varies.
The between-group comparisons were done using ANCOVA,
with the background variable(s) as the co-variate(s). When the
raw data deviated significantly from a normal distribution, they
were logarithmically (Strange Stories Physical State raw score;
SEE Receptive score; SEE Total score) or square root transformed
(AT MCQ-categorization raw score; SEE Expressive score; SRS
raw score) to approximate a normal distribution before analyses
were performed. The same procedure was followed for the
outcome variables from Strange Stories, AT, SEE, and SRS.
To determine the convergent validity of ToM-Frederik,
potential associations with the core variables derived from
Strange Stories and AT were analyzed using Pearson correlations
in the HFASD and TD groups separately. To assess the
discriminant validity of the ToM-Frederik score, we assessed
its potential associations with the two indices of intelligence
(Wechsler Block Design scale score, and Wechsler Vocabulary
scale score) in the subgroup that was assessed with these tests,
using Pearson correlations.
Finally, the potential associations between ToM-Frederik and
the SRS Total score were analyzed using Pearson correlations.
RESULTS
Background Variables
There was a considerable, and statistically significant, larger
percentage of boys in the HFASD compared to the TD group.
Consequently all between-group analyses were adjusted for
gender (see Table 1).
Test–Retest Reliability of ToM-Frederik
Ten out of the 14 participants aged 11–12 in the TD group,
participated in the retest assessment of ToM-Frederik. The test-
retest reliability estimate of the ToM-Frederik Total score was
good (r = 0.84, p = 0.003). In addition, the test-retest effect of
this score appeared relatively low and statistically non-significant
(ToM-Frederik Total score: Mtime1 = 22.70, SD = 4.06) and
Mtime2 = 24.30, SD= 2.58; p= 0.17).
Between-Group Comparisons
Theory-of-Mind Tasks
ToM-Frederik Total raw score was significantly lower in the
group of children with HFASD than in the TD group (see
Table 2).
TABLE 1 | Background variables.
HFASD TD
N M (SD) N M (SD) Analysis
Age in months 33 136.15 (23.04) 41 130.85 (20.81) t(72) = 1.038, p = 0.303
Vocabulary 27 9.15 (3.13) 40 10.60 (3.15) t(65) = −1.853, p = 0.068
Block Design 27 10.78 (2.72) 41 10.92 (4.14) t(66) = −0.160, p = 0.874
FSIQ 14∗ 103.43 (16.89) 0 − –
N N (%) N N (%)
Gender (N, % boys) 33 24 (73) 41 17 (41) R2(1) = 7.233, p = 0.007
HFASD, High Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders; TD, typically developing; SD, standard deviation; FSIQ, Full Scale IQ. ∗Eight of the patients with ASD assessed
with the two subtests also had a FSIQ score.
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Both the Strange Stories Mental State raw score and the
Strange Stories Physical State (logarithmically transformed) raw
score were significantly lower in the group of children with
HFASD than in the TD group. Still, the Mental State raw score
remained significantly lower in the HFASD group than in the
group of children when adjusted for Physical State raw score (see
Table 2).
With regard to the AT the score for AT Appropriateness
was significantly lower for the HFASD than for the TD
group in the Random, Goal-Directed, and ToM-type of
animations. The AT Intentionality score for the ToM-type
animations was significantly lower in the HFASD group than
the TD group. Conversely, for Random-type animations, the
intentionality score was significantly higher in the HFASD
group than in the TD group. For the Goal-directed-type
animations, there was no significant difference between the
HFASD group and the TD group (see Table 2). The AT
MCQ-categorization (square root transformed) Total score
was significantly lower in the HFASD group than in the
TD group. No significant difference was observed between
the groups for the AT MCQ-feelings Total score, though a
statistical trend was observed. A post hoc analysis revealed the
participants in the HFASD group had significantly more AT
missing answers than the participants in the TD group (see
Table 2).
Social Emotional Evaluation
The HFASD and the TD group did not differ with respect
to the SEE Receptive (logarithmically transformed) score, the
SEE Expressive (square root transformed) score or the SEE
Total (logarithmically transformed) score. For the SEE Social
Emotional Questionnaire (SEQ), a significantly lower percentage
of the maximum possible result was awarded to the HFASD than
the TD group. As SEE is only aimed at children aged 6–12,
these analyses where repeated without the children aged 13–14.
However, this did not significantly change the results (data not
shown). Thus, as SEE did not differentiate between the groups, it
was not included in the subsequent analyses.
Social Responsiveness Scale
The HFASD group had significantly higher SRS (square root
transformed) Total score than the TD group, indicating greater
severity of social impairment for the HFASD group.
Convergent and Discriminant Validity
As shown in Table 3, the score on ToM-Frederik was significantly
and positively correlated with both the Strange Stories Mental
State score and the AT ToM intentionality score in the HFASD
group. Furthermore, the Strange Stories Mental State score and
the AT ToM intentionality score were significantly and positively
TABLE 2 | Between-group comparisons.
HFASD TD
N M (SD) N M (SD)
ToM-Frederik 32 20.44 (4.9) 41 22.88 (4.4) F (2,70) = 4.027, p = 0.049
Strange stories
Mental state stories 31 8.45 (3.2) 41 10.90 (2.7) F (2,69) = 10.407, p = 0.002
Physical state stories 31 8.16 (2.3) 41 9.83 (2.5) F (2,69) = 7.854, p = 0.007
Mental state stories (adjusted for physical state stories) 31 8.45 (3.2) 41 10.90 (2.7) F (2,69) = 6.810, p = 0.011
Animated Triangles
Subjective
Appropriateness
Random 33 6.33 (3.9) 41 11.12 (1.4) F (2,71) = 49.394, p < 0.0001
Goal-directed 33 7.00 (3.7) 41 10.37 (1.1) F (2,71) = 26.433, p < 0.001
ToM 33 4.21(2.3) 41 8.66 (1.7) F (2,71) = 76.682, p < 0.001
Intentionality
Random 26 1.03 (0.6) 41 0.47 (0.5) F (2,64) = 14.663, p < 0.001
Goal-directed 28 2.27 (1.0) 41 2.42 (0.4) F (2,66) = 1.151, p < 0.287
ToM 27 3.12 (0.6) 41 3.70 (0.4) F (2,65) = 21.169, p < 0.001
Missing answers 33 2.79 (4.3) 41 0.02 (0.2) t(72) = 4.099, p < 0.001
Objective
MCQ-categorization 33 8.55 (2.7) 41 9.88 (1.5) F (2,71) = 8.249, p < 0.005
MCQ-feelings 33 3.30 (2.2) 41 4.24 (2.1) F (2,71) = 3.403, p < 0.069
The Social Emotional Evaluation (SEE)
Receptive score 32 52.19 (4.1) 41 54.09 (2.9) F (2,70) = 3.080, p = 0.084
Expressive score 32 37.69 (10.5) 41 40.02 (6.6) F (2,70) = 1.102, p = 0.297
Total score 32 89.88 (13.3) 41 94.12 (9.0) F (2,70) = 1.736, p = 0.192
The SEE Social Emotional Questionnaire (SEQ)
Percent of maximum points 33 0.57 (0.2) 41 0.87 (0.2) F (2,71) = 32.679, p < 0.001
Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) 33 85.52 (30.0) 41 19.76 (13.2) F (2,71) = 171.359, p < 0.001
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correlated with each other. However, while the score on ToM-
Frederik was significantly and positively correlated with the
Strange Stories Mental State score in the TD group, it was
not significantly correlated to the AT ToM intentionality score.
Furthermore the Strange Stories Mental State score and the
AT ToM intentionality score did not correlate significantly (see
Table 3).
Analyses showed that ToM-Frederik was not significantly
correlated with SRS in neither the HFASD nor the TD group (see
Table 4).
In terms of discriminant validity of the ToM-Frederik task,
we observed no significant associations between the indices of
intelligence and the ToM-Frederik score in neither the full sample
(Vocabulary: r = 0.035, p = 0.779, n = 67; Block Design:
r = −0.026, p = 0.834, n = 66) nor the TD group (Vocabulary:
r = −0.127, p = 0.433, n = 40; Block Design: r = −0.100,
p = 0.545, n = 39) or the HFASD group (Vocabulary: r = 0.132,
p= 0.513, n= 27; Block Design: r = 0.098, p= 0.628, n= 27).
DISCUSSION
The main aim of the present study was to examine aspects
of validity and reliability of the Danish versions of the ToM-
Frederik as a measure of ToM deficits. Our findings support the
validity of ToM-Frederik as a measure of ToM as it was able
to identify, at the group level, the expected ToM deficits in this
sample of older children and young adolescents with HFASD.
This is in line with previous findings in a study comparing 3–
12 year-old children with PDD-NOS and TD children using
the Dutch version of ToM-Frederik (Blijd-Hoogewys et al.,
2008). Furthermore, the convergent validity of ToM-Frederik
as a measure of ToM was supported by its significant positive
associations with the Strange Stories and the AT scores in the
HFASD group, whereas ToM-Frederik was only significantly
correlated with Strange Stories, but not with AT, in the TD
group. Based on the current data it is not possible to give
conclusive explanations of this latter and unexpected finding.
However, it might be caused by the relatively low variation
in AT Intentionality scores. The discriminant validity of ToM-
Frederik as a measure of TOM was supported by its non-
significant associations with our indices of intelligence; this
TABLE 3 | Correlations between measures of Theory-of-Mind.
Strange Stories AT
r p N r p N
HFASD
ToM-Frederik 0.570 0.001 31 0.484 0.011 27
Strange stories – – – 0.521 0.005 27
TD
ToM-Frederik 0.462 0.002 41 0.125 0.434 41
Strange stories – – – 0.117 0.468 41
HFASD, High Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders; TD, typically developing;
SRS, Social Responsiveness Scale.
TABLE 4 | Correlations between Social Responsiveness Scale and
measures of Theory-of-Mind.
SRS
r p N
HFASD
ToM-Frederik Total score −0.061 0.738 32
Strange Stories Mental State score −0.084 0.653 31
Animated TrianglesToM Intentionality score −0.137 0.495 27
TD
ToM-Frederik Total score −0.100 0.532 41
Strange Stories Mental State score −0.200 0.009 41
Animated Triangles ToM Intentionality score −0.121 0.434 41
HFASD, High Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders; TD, typically developing;
SRS, Social Responsiveness Scale.
was the case for the full sample as for the TD and HFASD
groups.
ToM-Frederik was not significantly associated with SRS
in neither the HFASD nor the TD group. The lack of a
significant association in the HFASD group may be explained
by the repetitive/stereotypic behavior items included in the
SRS. The repetitive/stereotypic behaviors of ASD may be
associated with executive function deficits, whereas ToM-
impairments in ASD may be associated more with impairments
of reciprocal interaction and communication (Hughes et al.,
1994; Joseph, 1999). The SRS covers all three dimensions of
impairments in ASD (reciprocal interaction, communication,
and repetitive/stereotypic behaviors). Therefore the items
on repetitive/stereotypic behavior may have confounded the
potential associations between real life communication and
social interaction deficits and ToM.
The findings are also in support of the Danish versions of the
Strange Stories and AT as measures of ToM, because they were
able to identify, at the group level, the expected ToM deficits in
this sample of older children and young adolescents with HFASD.
The findings on the Strange Stories task are in line with previous
findings reporting significant group differences in the Mental
State stories in a study comparing 7–12-year-old children with
autism and TD children (White et al., 2009). However, in contrast
to the latter study, we also found significant group differences
in the Physical State stories. Nevertheless, when adjusted for
Physical State stories the group differences for the Mental State
stories remained significant. Thus, the difference in score seems
to reflect a specific impairment of ToM.
In terms of AT, the current findings are in line with previous
work in children and adolescents reporting there are significant
differences between groups of HFASD and TD (Salter et al.,
2008; Schwenck et al., 2012). Only one of these studies did assess
AT Intentionality, but in contrast to the current study, Salter
et al. (2008) did not find significant between-group differences
in the AT Intentionality score for any type of animations in
their 6–20-year old sample. In terms of the objective AT scoring,
we only found a significant lower MCQ categorization score in
the children and adolescents with HFASD, whereas White et al.
(2011) also observed a significant difference for the MCQ feelings
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in adults. This objective AT scoring measure has not previously
been applied to children and young adolescents. As only about
50% of the answers in the TD group were correct, the MCQ
Feelings part of the task may be too difficult for this young age
group.
The findings are in support of the SRS; the biggest gap in
ToM scores between HFASD and TD was found on this test.
In addition, our findings support validity of the SEQ parent
questionnaire as a sensitive measure of real life social and
communicative behavior deficits in children and adolescents with
HFASD. On the other hand, the SEE task was not supported
as a valid measure of impairments of social skills, as the scores
did not differ significantly between the groups on any SEE
scales. In terms of the SEE Receptive, both groups score close
to ceiling which may indicate that this part of the test is too
easy for many children with TD and even for many children
with HFASD. In contrast, it may be too difficult for the children
with TD to attain high scores on the SEE Expressive. However,
based on the present dataset, it is difficult to provide any
conclusive explanations of the lack of significant between-group
differences.
Strengths and Limitations
The main strength of this study is the relatively comprehensive
social cognitive test battery, making us able to assess convergent
validity of the TOM-Frederik Task. Seven of the 33 children in
the HFASD group did not complete all tasks. These children
may have a lower level of functioning, but as we do not have
comparable IQ data for all participants it is not possible to assess
this in the present dataset. However, all participants have an IQ
within the normal range.
The present study also has some limitations. The gender
distribution differed between the HFASD and the TD group,
with more boys in the HFASD group. A number of previous
studies have reported significant gender differences in ToM
(Charman, 2002; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; Sabbagh et al., 2006),
and although not all studies find significant gender differences
on ToM development (Calero et al., 2013), gender may be a
confounding factor.
The assessment of the test–retest-reliability of the ToM-
Frederik task was not based on an age representative subsample
and only included a small subsample of 11–12-year-olds from
the TD group. Consequently, the test–retest-reliability estimate
may not be generalizable to other age groups of children with
TD or to children with HFASD. The test–retest reliability of the
Danish version of ToM-Frederik was not assessed for children
with HFASD. A previous study has found good test–retest-
reliability of the original ToM-Frank in children with pervasive
developmental disorder not otherwise specified (Blijd-Hoogewys
et al., 2008).
Directions for Future Research
Future research on ToM-Frederik should include groups with
other psychiatric diagnoses in order to assess trans-diagnostic
applicability of the tests. Furthermore, future research should
also include more participants across the age-span in order to be
able to identify at what age AT MCQ Feelings becomes able to
identify significant group differences. Finally, the separation of
the two groups by ToM-Frederik may be due to other differences
picked up by the instruments, e.g., differences in language and
motivation. Future studies should further explore to what degree
the performance on the ToM-Frederik is influenced by such
factors.
CONCLUSION
The current study provides overall support for the validity of the
Danish version of the Theory-of-Mind Storybook Frederik as a
measure of ToM. The task was able to identify, at the group level,
the expected ToM deficits in this sample of older children and
young adolescents with HFASD. Furthermore, the convergent
validity of ToM-Frederik as a measure of ToM was supported
by significant positive associations with the Strange Stories and
the AT scores in the HFASD group, whereas ToM-Frederik was
significantly correlated with Strange Stories, but not with AT,
in the TD group. Finally, ToM-Frederik was not significantly
associated with SRS in neither the HFASD nor the TD group.
The task represents a gain for both research and clinical practice,
as it is relatively fast to administer and provides outcome based
on a highly nuanced scoring. All three ToM tasks were able to
discriminate between the two groups but the scoring system of
the ToM-Frederik allows for a more detailed categorization of
different types of ToM deficits.
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